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ABSTRACT: A national survey and intensive surveys in three
cities were undertaken for the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereinafter
referred to as the National Crime Commission), to assess crime
incidence by asking random samples of the public whether they
had been victimized by crime. The major difficulties of these
surveys arose from victimization’s being an infrequent and
usually not highly salient life event for most people. Even
though these surveys found victimization to be far more
common than suggested by national or local police statistics,
they captured people’s experiences selectively and incom-
pletely. The immediate data from a victim survey naturally
differ in form from police and other agency statistics. While
these make the survey data distinctively instructive, they
present problems for comparison with police statistics. Such
comparisons as can be made suggest that a large volume of
citizen complaints to the police are not reflected in published
offense statistics.
* Preparation of this paper was assisted by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation and
draws upon research supported by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, U.S. Department
of Justice.
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A part of its assessment of crime
in America, the National Crime
Commission in 1966 sponsored the first
intensive attempts to use surveys of
samples of the general public for esti-
mating the incidence of crime. One of
the most widely quoted sentences in the
Commission’s assessment of crime has
been: &dquo;These surveys show that the
actual amount of crime in the United
States today is several times that re-
ported in the UCR.&dquo; 1
Two sets of data amplifying this con-
clusion were reproduced from surveys
by the report. The first (Table 1)
compared UCR crime rates with esti-
mates from a National Opinion Re-
search Center (NORC) survey of mem-
bers of a national sample comprising
10,000 households. The person inter-
viewed in each household had been
asked whether he or anyone living with
him had been a victim of a crime dur-
ing the preceding twelve months. The
surveys estimated the rate of person
crimes to be twice as high as that of
the UCR and more than twice as high
for property crimes. A more extreme
deviation of survey-derived estimates
from those based on police data was
shown in a chart (Figure 1) based on
a survey by the Bureau of Social Sci-
ence Research (BSSR) in high- and
medium-crime-rate precincts in Wash-
ington, D.C. Here, with data restricted
to adults and with victimization of busi-
ness and transient victims excluded
from police estimates, the survey rates
for offense classes were from three to
ten times the number contained in police
statistics.
&dquo;How much crime is there?&dquo; is
hardly a simple question; the sample-
1 U.S., President’s Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,
hereinafter referred to as General Report
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), p. 21. "UCR" in the quotation
is a reference to data reported annually in
U.S., Department of Justice, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Crime in the United States:
Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1930&mdash;
[annually]). In the present paper, UCR will
be used to refer to this annual and the
Uniform Crime Reporting System that it
employs.
TABLE I-COMPARISON OF SURVEY AND UCR RATES
(PER 100,000 POPULATION)
- ~._~---
a Crime in tlae United States: Uniforrra Crime Reports, op. cit., 1965, p. 51. The UCR na-
tional totals do not distinguish crimes committed against individuals or households from those
committed against businesses or other organizations. The UCR rate for individuals is the published
national rate adjusted to eliminate burglaries, larcenies, and vehicle thefts not committed against
individuals or households. No adjustment was made for robbery.
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survey approach to answering it is
fraught with complexities; and compar-
ing survey estimates with those of the
UCR can be performed only with some
strain to both sources of data. This
paper describes how the surveys in
question dealt with these problems and
the implications of their method for
knowledge regarding the incidence of
crime.
PLANNING OF THE STUDIES
The advisability of conducting an
extensive, national, cross-sectional sur-
vey to estimate the incidence of crime
was accepted early in the work-planning
of the National Crime Commission.2
Its feasibility, however, was at issue.
Paradoxically, an endeavor occasioned
by an almost universally shared senti-
ment that crime was exceeding all
bounds had to confront as its greatest
planning problem the possibility that
there might not be enough crime-that
2 The President’s Commission on Crime in
the District of Columbia had parallel interests
in exploring crime in the capital. This led
to early sponsorship of the surveys in
Washington.
is, not enough for it to be economically
measurable by the sample-survey me-
thod. The UCR Crime Index for the
most recent year showed a rate of only
about fourteen Index crimes for every
thousand persons in the population. A
large and not precisely estimatable pro-
portion of these involved offenses against
businesses and other organizations. The
latter, it was early concluded, could not
be measured by a population cross-
section survey, but rather required more
complex and costly approaches. A na-
tional survey would have to be restricted
to crimes against the private citizen or
the residential household. Discourag-
ing estimates still remained even after
allowing for an appreciably large &dquo;dark
figure&dquo; of crime and for the fact that
the number of crime victims (or vic-
timization rates) greatly exceed the
number of offenses (or offence rats) .3 3
The first crude estimates posited that
something on the order of twenty adults
per thousand nationally were victims of
an Index crime in a given year, although
3 See Albert D. Biderman and Albert J.
Reiss, Jr., &dquo;On Exploring the ’Dark Figure’
of Crime,&dquo; in this issue of THE ANNALS,
pp. 1-15.
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the rate might be as much as five times
greater in high-crime urban areas.
These estimates presented the follow-
ing implications for the use of the
survey method that was being contem-
plated by the National Crime Commis-
sion during the Fall of 1965:
A very large population sample-
30,000 households or more-would have
to be used to produce a sufficient
number of recent incidents of victimi-
zation-
... Unless respondents could re-
member and report reliably on
victimization that occurred over
an extended period of their life,
or
... Unless one respondent could re-
port reliably regarding the vic-
timization for all members of
a household, or
... Unless the volume of the &dquo;dark
figure&dquo; that might be revealed
by survey methods proved to
be several times the magnitude
of crimes known to the police.
The urgent time requirements of re-
search undertaken for the Commission
dictated a research strategy that hedged
these possibilities. The Bureau of So-
cial Science Research (BSSR) undertook
an immediate effort, in conjunction with
its precinct studies for the District of
Columbia Crime Commission, to ex-
plore instruments and approaches which
might also be used in a national study
and for some indication of the frequen-
cies of victimization which the interview
might yield.4 At the same time, consulta-
tions were begun regarding the feasibil-
ity of employing for a national survey
the only known agency with a ready
capability for interviewing extremely
large national population samples-the
Current Population Survey of the Bu-
reau of the Census, which regularly
interviews a sample of respondents cov-
ering approximately 30,000 American
households.
PRETEST EXPERIENCE
In its Washington pretesting, the
BSSR study tried a number of differeni
question-orders and question-wordings
Telephone interviews were also tried;
but these were quickly found to yield
many fewer recollections of having been
a victim of an offense than door-bell-
ringing interviewers were reporting.
The latter’s interviews, however, in-
cluded many more reports of victimi-
zation than had been predicted. Over
two-thirds of the Washington pretest re-
spondents told of some criminal incident
that had victimized their household at
some time, and there was a very heavy
concentration of these mentions in
recent periods.
Additional evidence of the feasibility
of using smaller samples became avail-
able to the Commission at the same time.
In November 1965, independently of
the pretest for the Crime Commission,
the National Opinion Research Center
(NORC) incorporated several questions
on crime-victimization in one of its per-
iodic national surveys. Of 1,520 house-
holds covered, 47 per cent reported
4 Albert D. Biderman, Louise A. Johnson,
Jennie McIntyre, and Adrianne W. Weir,
Report on a Pilot Study in the District of
Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes
toward Law Enforcement, U.S. President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice Field Survey I
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967). This "forced draught" study
also prepared an early preliminary report
on crime incidence in Washington for use
by the District of Columbia Crime Com-
mission, which had to complete its work
a half-year earlier than the National Com-
mission : Albert D. Biderman et al., "Salient
Findings on Crime and Attitudes toward Law
Enforcement in the District of Columbia,"
Bureau of Social Science Research, Wash-
ington, D.C., May 1966 (Mimeographed).
The studies were supported by the Office of
Law Enforcement Assistance of the Depart-
ment of Justice.
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having been victimized at one time or
another, and 11 per cent had been vic-
timized by something they considered a
crime during the current year.’’
THE SURVEYS FOR TIIE COMMISSION
Since both the NORC and the BSSR
testing suggested that yet greater fre-
quencies might be found with improve-
ments in the interviewing procedures,
and since it was still uncertain that the
resources of the Census Bureau could be
allocated to the project quickly enough
to produce data for use by the National
Crime Commission, the decision was
made to have the national survey pro-
ceed with a smaller sample (10,000
households) and a private contractor,
the NORC.1,
BSSR pretests established that even
very small samples of city residents
would provide sufficient data on vic-
timization for useful analysis. Inten-
sive sampling in selected police districts
of cities opened the way for analysis
in terms of detailed information on the
social characteristics of areas, the nature
of police operations in these areas, and
comparability with police statistics and
data on crime from other special studies
being planned by the University of
Michigan for Washington, D.C., and
other cities.7 7
BSSR continued with its pilot study
employing a sample of 511 residents of
three police precincts in Washington,
D.C. Procedures developed in this sur-
vey were improved and adapted for
surveys of victimization that were con-
ducted by Albert J. Reiss, Jr., of the
University of Michigan, covering 600
households in two police districts in
each of two other cities (Boston and
Chicago ) .8 BSSR also used this modi-
fied procedure in an additional Wash-
ington police precinct in which 282 resi-
dents were interviewed. The precincts
showed medium to high crime rates in
police data. Three of the Washington
precincts and one of those chosen in
both Boston and ChicagoO had predomi-
nantly nonwhite populations. Table 2
summarizes the dimensions of these
studies.
The objectives of the surveys went
considerably beyond exploring the
&dquo;dark figure&dquo; of crime. For each inci-
dent, respondents were questioned on
when, where, how, and why the offense
had taken place; on characteristics of
the offenders; on the extent and nature
of losses and recovery or indemnifica-
tion for these; and on investigatory and
adjudicatory processes that ensued. All
of this information regarding victimiza-
tion could be related to detailed infor-
mation that was also collected in the
surveys on social-background character-
istics of the victims; their attitudes
toward many issues relating to crime,
law enforcement, and justice; and some
5 Unpublished Memorandum from the Na-
tional Opinion Research Center to the Presi-
dent’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, February 18, 1966.
6 Philip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in
the United States: A Report of a National
Survey, U.S. President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice
Field Survey II (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967).
7 For a description of the integrated studies
of crime by the University of Michigan, see
Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (ed.), Studies in Crime
and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan
Areas, Vol. I, U.S. President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice Field Survey III (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).
8 Ibid. The victimization interview was
further adapted by the University of Michi-
gan for questioning representatives of business
and other organizations in Boston, Chicago,
and Washington.
9 During the course of the study in one of
the Chicago districts, a serious riot occurred
in the area. Its effects on the data of the
study are probably very pronounced. Data
from this area, consequently, are omitted from
the present discussion.
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TABLE 2-1966 SURVEYS OF VICTIMIZATION
S Used in making twelve-month incidence rate estimates.
b Representing 33,000 members of these households.
other relevant aspects of their experi-
ence and behavior.
Because of the great attention that
has been given to the matter of gross
estimates of crime incidence, however,
attention will be directed here exclu-
sively to examining the procedures bear-
ing on this aspect of the surveys.110
Examining the methodological problems
carefully is important for three reasons.
First, any enthusiasm for this innova-
tional method that may derive from its
success at demonstrating the existence
of a vast &dquo;dark figure&dquo; of crime should
be tempered by recognition of the lim-
ited refinement thus far achieved in
applying the data to description and in-
terpretation of dimensions of the crime
picture. Second, the cross-sectional sur-
vey affords data on crime that differ
in some key and instructive respects
from agency statistics.ll Third, under-
standings developed regarding some
major methodological problems yielded
some understandings about crime
equally as interesting as those yielded
by application of the method to the
problem of gross estimation.
PROBLEMS OF RECALL
An assumption that guided the plan-
ning of the work followed from the
dramatic connotations of the word
&dquo;crime.&dquo; It was assumed that most
&dquo;Index&dquo; crimes, as well as a large num-
ber of other types of offenses, would
be very salient events in the victims’
lives. There was some confidence that
a survey respondent would be able to
10 Some findings from the survey relating
to attitudes are discussed in Jennie Mc-
Intyre, "Public Attitudes toward Crime and
Law Enforcement," in this issue of THE
ANNALS, pp. 34-46. 11 See Biderman and Riess, op. cit.
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recall the occurrence of such incidents
for a considerable span of time, even
though he might not be able to remem-
ber many particular details of the event.
The assumption that much crime-vic-
timization is an event as readily recalled
as births, deaths, or marriages in the
family was proved unfounded.
TIME AND INCIDENT MENTIONS
In testing interview methods, the
number of incidents mentioned by the
average respondent increased as more
specific and focused questions about
victimization were tried. Asking about
specific types of events, persons affected,
and time periods proved particularly
important. This effect is so marked
that about the same volume of reports
of victimization were yielded in BSSR
pretests by asking people what had
happened to them during only the most
recent year as by asking them whether
they had ever been victimized. The
effect of not focusing the recall of the
respondent on a particular time period
may explain the results of a privately
conducted national poll, published in
July 1966, which used a &dquo;Were you
ever ... ? &dquo; type of question. Only
one of every eleven adults in the
sample told of having ever been vic-
timized in response to this question-
slightly fewer than the response rate to
an NORC question which asked about
the past twelve months only. 12
The effect of lack of time focus in a
question is distinguishable from the
effects of the passage of time on re-
spondents’ ability to recall incidents
within the limited opportunities for re-
flection the interview affords. Respon-
dents in all of the surveys mentioned
many more recent incidents than older
ones. BSSR preliminary interviewing
which used members of the research
organization as subjects was particu-
larly instructive. In each case, these
people reported back hours, days, and
even weeks later about incidents that
they had not remembered at the time
they were first interviewed. This rec-
ency effect was markedly evident within
the one-year period which all three
surveys used as a basis for forming rate
estimates. It also was found when re-
sponses to questions covering longer time
spans were tabulated-for example, re-
sponses to a BSSR question about the
worst crime that the respondent had
ever experienced. The effect was far
more pronounced than can plausibly be
attributed to any over-all trend or
seasonality in crime incidence.
Using a short recall-span for rate-
estimation would compensate for for-
getting on the part of respondents, but
it assumes no seasonality or long-term
trends in the &dquo;true rate&dquo; of crime.
Were victimization rate estimates to be
based only on incidents in the most
recent six-month period and this rate
projected to an annual one, the several
studies would yield estimates 25 to 30
per cent greater. The difference would
be even more pronounced if rates were
estimated from the incidents of just the
most recent three months of the NORC
data-the result would be a 60 per cent
greater estimate. This is partly a con-
sequence of another distortion in in-
terview testimony, which we will next
discuss.
TIME TELESCOPING
The time distributions of respondents’
reports were complicated by a problem
regularly encountered in surveys asking
people to recount life events. This is
called &dquo;time telescoping,&dquo; although the
term is used to describe the person’s
recalling an event as having happened
less recently than was actually the case
as well as to describe forward shifting
12 Louis Harris, "The Nation: Eye-for-an-
Eye Rule Rejected," Washington Post, July
3, 1966, p. E3.
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of the recall.13 A particular hazard of
&dquo;telescoping&dquo; is that respondents may
sometimes tend to shift events that hap-
pened before or after a time interval
about which they are asked into that
interval. The distribution of incidents
in the national survey had a bulge at
the beginning of the twelve-month pe-
riod regarding which respondents were
asked to report. But this was a much
less pronounced bulge than that at the
recent end of the distribution. This
&dquo;J&dquo; shape suggests that both recency
and telescoping effects operated, with
the former being more pronounced. The
BSSR and Michigan surveys controlled
telescoping, at least partially, by asking
respondents to report events covering a
period extending further at both ex-
tremes than the twelve months used for
estimation purposes. While avoiding
the &dquo;J&dquo; shape, the wider time-focus in
the questioning presumably makes re-
call more difficult.
Although it is theoretically possible
to use the survey method for a measure
of the entire life experience of each
respondent (which, in turn, could be
converted into an historical measure for
the entire population), in practice this
would presumably require, to say the
least, very time-consuming interview
methods.
SERIOUSNESS
Another assumption altered by the
actual experience of these surveys was
that respondents would report minor
and even trivial incidents of victimi-
zation in high proportion. Indeed, in
line with the objective of having the
surveys supplement police statistics as
much as possible, a number of features
of the interviewing procedure explicitly
encouraged the respondent to report
&dquo;even little things.&dquo; (Interviewers de-
fined crime for the respondents as:
&dquo;Anything somebody could be sent to
prison or fined for doing to you-or
even for trying to do it.&dquo;) In the
BSSR pilot study, however, with the
exception of auto theft and malicious
destruction of property, which figure
more frequently in survey data, the
classes of offenses reported by survey
respondents had close to the same rank-
order as did police data for victim-type
offenses for the same precincts. As was
shown in Table 1, NORC’s national
sample had a rank-ordering of mentions
of Index offenses quite similar to that
in the UCR Crime Index.
The average loss in burglaries re-
ported by NORC’s respondents was
$190, considerably below the over-$260
figure of the UCR.14 Of the larcenies
in the BSSR survey data, however,
a higher proportion involved claimed
losses of over $100 than was true of
police data for the same Washington
precincts. This may be due to victims’
tendencies to attribute higher value to
losses than would be the case in police
estimates.
When a &dquo;seriousness scale&dquo; for crimes,
developed by Sellin and Wolfgang, 15
was applied, the mean score for each
frequent class of offense described by
BSSR survey victims was very close to
that computed from a large number of
Philadelphia arrest records used in de-
veloping the original measure.
In the BSSR pilot study, 55 per cent
of the described incidents were classi-
fied as Index offenses, and almost two-
thirds were Part I offenses. Only
about one-third of the incidents in the
national survey involved Index crimes,
13 U.S., Bureau of the Census, Response
Errors in Collection of Expenditures Data
by Household Interviews: An Experimental
Study, Technical Paper No. 11 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).
14 Crime in the United States: Uniform
Crime Reports, 1965, op. cit., p. 105.
15 Thorsten Sellin and Marvin E. Wolfgang,
The Measurement of Delinquency (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1964).
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quite possibly because these are more
characteristic of big-city victimization.
It had also been assumed that some
types of serious victimization might not
be mentioned because of negligence or
contributory behavior on the victim’s
part or because of embarrassment in the
case of sex offenses. In the BSSR
study which asked about this specifi-
cally, in about 25 per cent of the cases
victims acknowledged that their negli-
gence (11 per cent) or some act of
commission on their part had contrib-
uted to their victimization. With re-
gard to reticence from embarrassment,
the precinct studies found much higher
volumes of sex offenses (often described
in frankest detail) than expected on the
basis of police data. While these us-
ually involved voyeurism or exhibition-
ism, molestations and rapes were men-
tioned with some frequency.
HOUSEHOLD INFORMANTS
The assumption of the experiential
salience of victimization made it appear
promising to use any responsible person
first contacted in a sampled household
as an informant for all crimes against
members of that household. Despite
some expected losses of information in
cases where members of the same house-
hold may be inclined to keep victimiza-
tion secret from one another, this pro-
cedure affords vast gains in economy
for what, at its most economical, is a
very expensive data-collection method.
Also recommending the household-in-
formant method is that most offenses
against private citizens can be regarded
as victimizing all members of the house-
hold simultaneously, so that, theoreti-
cally, any responsible member of the
house would be about as good a source
of information regarding the event as
any other member. In the BSSR pilot
study, two-thirds of all recent incidents
of victimization were classed, although
often somewhat arbitrarily, as victim-
izing the household as a whole.
In the case of offenses against indi-
viduals, however, BSSR pretests found
that the people interviewed about crimes
in their household mentioned incidents
of which they themselves were the vic-
tim in great disproportion to incidents
affecting others who lived with them.
For this reason, the BSSR and Michi-
gan studies used interviews with a desig-
nated, randomly selected adult within
each sampled household. Although
these respondents were also asked to
provide data on victimization of other
individuals, primary attention in analy-
sis was given to the victimization of the
respondent, either as an individual or
as a member of a victimized household.
The inefficiency of questioning about
other members is indicated by the find-
ing that there was no positive correla-
tion found in the BSSR study between
the size of household and the number
of incidents reported by the respondent.
The national study, for reasons of
economy, used the most readily avail-
able adult as the household informant
rather than randomly selected ones.
The strategy was to identify from this
&dquo;screener&dquo; respondent those members
of the household who had been victim-
ized during the previous twelve months.
Call-backs were then made, as neces-
sary, to gain detailed information about
the individual incidents from the actual
victim.
As was found in the BSSR tests, the
NORC household &dquo;screener&dquo; respon-
dents identified themselves as personal
victims of offenses more frequently than
they mentioned incidents against other
household members. For the two of-
fenses involving individuals as victims
for which data are given-assault and
robbery-twice as many of the incidents
were against the 48 per cent of the
adult householders who were household
informants as against the other adult
25
members. The effect was even more
pronounced for Negro households. The
resulting distortion is greater than these
figures suggest. Housewives and other
nonemployed persons, who are much
more likely to be the person at home
when an interviewer calls, would also
be expected to be much less often
victims of these offenses. Presumably
as a result of this aspect of the proce-
dure, NORC data show, for example,
females victimized more often by as-
sault and robbery than males. Other
comparisons of victimization rates by
personal characteristics of the victims,
such as age, sex, education or occupa-
tion, are rendered equally suspect for
the same reason.
Less affected are analyses of char-
acteristics that victims share in common
with all members of their family, such
as family income, place of residence,
or occupation of the head of the house-
hold. Here the distortion from use of
&dquo;screener&dquo; informants is significant only
by inflation or deflation of victim rates
for categories of families depending
upon the differential likelihood of a
high-risk member or a low-risk member
being the adult first contacted by the
interviewer. Thus, unattached males
would be expected to show artifactually
inflated rates of person crimes relative
to family breadwinners, and the same
would be the case with members of
households consisting solely of adults
working full-time.
For offenses victimizing the entire
household, such as vandalism or bur-
glary, the nonrandom selection of the
screener informant was also of less con-
sequence to the NORC results. (The
BSSR studies, however, found some
tendency for women to mention more
incidents affecting household property
than was the case when a man was
interviewed, as might be expected, given
the woman’s special role in the home.)
In analyzing victimization data by
characteristics of the victims, only the
head of the household was considered
the victim in the analyses of the na-
tional study. Among the distortions
resulting from this procedure is a vast
overstatement of male victimization
relative to female in several classes of
crime, including burglary, larceny, auto
theft, auto offenses, and malicious mis-
chief. White males, for example, are
shown as being burglary victims over
six times as frequently as white females.
This defect of the statistics can readily
be overcome in future analysis where
deadlines are less urgent. Character-
istics of all household members can
be counted for household offenses; or
analysis can be made of such incidents
exclusively in terms of household units
rather than persons.
In the case of distortions of victim
characteristics in individual-type of-
fenses, as well, the NORC collected
data which will permit some degree of
correction of the distortion in future
analyses. These included questionnaires
completed for a sample of persons not
identified by &dquo;screener&dquo; respondents as
victims.
SELECTIVITY IN UNDERREPORTING
Victimization rates, as measured by
the survey, thus may vary among vari-
ous categories of respondents because of
differences in their behavior as interview
subjects, as well as because of differ-
ences in their actual experience with
crime. The disposition and ability to
recall events, co-operativeness with the
interviewer, and different understand-
ings of what constitutes a crime may
affect the number and types of incidents
a given respondent reports. His role
in the household, apparently, has much
to do with what he (more frequently,
she) reports as an informant about
other members. That the survey re-
flects far more of all episodes of criminal
victimization that occur in the commu-
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nity than do police statistics provides
no guarantee that it does so less selec-
tively as among categories of respon-
dents or crime classifications. Data
from these surveys, therefore, cannot
answer satisfactorily the question of
why some kinds of people are more
prone to victimization than are others
until there are at least some good
answers to the question of why some
people are more likely to mention vic-
timization when asked about it in a
certain way by a survey interviewer.
The situation is analagous to alternative
interpretations of police statistics as
reflecting both reporting behavior and
victimization.
Class-linked underreporting
The problem of interpretation may
be clarified by examining the relation
of social-class variables to the number
of incidents of victimization mentioned
by survey respondents.
It is generally taken for granted that
crime-at least the common offenses
that figure in the Crime Index-is most
prevalent in lower-class areas. Crim-
inality is believed to be inversely re-
lated, statistically, to most dimensions
of social-class standing. Older studies
suggest that victims tend to resemble
offenders for many crimes, since crim-
inals tend to be hon2eoagg~edic: slum
dwellers tend to victimize slum dwellers,
sons victimize fathers, gamblers other
gamblers, and the like.
The results of the several surveys
were inconsistent with such hypotheses
in many respects, if survey victimization
rates are interpreted literally. The
BSSR survey found the frequency of
mentions of incidents of victimization
directly related to most social-class-
linked variables that it tested. More
victimization was reported by home-
owners than renters; by residents of
single-family structures and elevator
apartments than those in walk-ups or
rooming houses; by residents of sound
structures rather than dilapidated or
deteriorating ones; by those paying
higher rentals; by members of intact
families as compared with unattached
individuals; and the like. The most
discriminating variable of all was edu-
cation, but a sharp break was discer-
nible only at the level of college edu-
cation. College-educated respondents
reported more frequent victimization
than others.
Some of these distributions by social-
class related variables, however, had a
noticeable hump at the bottom of the
class scale. When unambiguously low-
socioeconomic-status respondents were
differentiated on the basis of income,
occupation, and education, their vic-
timization rate was greater than that
among the &dquo;middle-class,&dquo; but slightly
less than that of the highest-level
subjects.
A plausible interpretation of these
results is that victimization mentions in
the survey were functions of both the
degree of real exposure and the &dquo;pro-
ductivity&dquo; of the respondent as an inter-
view subject.16
Comparison of rates in reports of the
national survey are more difficult to
examine for possible interview effects
because the data are not presented in
terms of a rate per actual respondent.
Nonetheless, data reported by NORC
on crime incidence by race and income
are generally similar to those of BSSR
(Table 3). Whites have higher survey
16 Other research, however, suggests the
possibility that the higher-socioeconomic-level
respondents in the particular areas studied
may have high victimization rates. High
rates for such offenses as burglary have been
found in police statistics for upper-income
census tracts contiguous to very low-income
ones&mdash;a situation characteristic of the resi-
dence of all high-socioeconomic-status respon-
dents in the BSSR study. See Sarah L.
Boggs, "Urban Crime Patterns," American
Sociological Review, Vol. 30 (December 1965),
pp. 899-909.
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incidence rates than Negroes. The of the interview method, so that more
higher the income, the higher the survey recent, more serious, more convention-
victimization rate for both racial cate- ally &dquo;criminal,&dquo; and less embarrassing
gories. Lower-income respondents and, kinds of victimization are more likely
more pronouncedly, nonwhites, tend to to be mentioned. (The BSSR survey
report victimization by Index offenses found rates for more recent incidents
in greater proportion than the (usually) less class-linked than those for older
less serious non-Index offenses. In the ones.) Some of these factors doubtless
case of Index offenses, for both whites affect total interview productivity more
and nonwhites, there is a decided dip than others. Thus, there were as many
in rates at the middle of the income rapes reported as incidents of victimiza-
distribution. Nonwhites have higher In- tion by bad checks, counterfeit money,
dex victimization rates than do whites. or other forgeries combined; twice as
That this is probably due to greater many burglaries as victimizations by
&dquo;productivity&dquo; in the interview situa- drunken or negligent driving; about the
tion of the higher-income (and usually same number of burglaries as cases of
better-educated) respondent is sug- malicious mischief; many more aggra-
gested by examination of larceny vic- vated assaults than consumer frauds;
timization. One would expect that, and the like 11 (see Table 4).
when victimized by a larceny, the less
wealthy person or household would be OTHER RESTRICTIONS OF RESPON-
less likely to suffer a loss above $50 DENTS’ REPORTS
than the wealthier ones. In NORC’s
data, however, a higher proportion of all In addition to the expense of lengthy
larcenies affecting those with family in- interviews to a study, questioning re-
comes under $6,000 are Index larcenies garding victimization can be extremely
than in the case of thefts from those time-consuming for a frequently vic-
with higher incomes. A similar inter- timized respondent. In the national
pretation may account for nonwhites survey, NORC limited interviewing of
reporting many more aggravated as- any victim to two incidents. This pro-
saults than simple assaults.
The simple rank-ordering of classes 17 A slight distortion in the direction of
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. 
more serious offenses results from the pro-of offenses by frequency of mentions more serious offenses results from the pro-cedure of eliminating l ss serious offenses in
in the national survey is presumably interviewing respondents who reported more
affected by various output restrictions than two incidents.
TABLE 3-PER CAPITA CRIME INCIDENCE BY RACE AND INCOMEA
a Based on Ennis, op. cit., p. 31.
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TABLE 4-VICTIMIZATION INCIDENTS USED TO
ESTIMATE CRIME RATES (NORC
NATIONAL SAMPLE)’
a Frequencies are taken from p. 108, rates from
pp. 8 and 11, Ennis, op. cit. No attempt has been
made to adjust slight discrepancies between fre-
quency and rate.
duced some artificial reduction of the
victimization rates presented.
Although the BSSR and Michigan
surveys imposed no such ceiling, there
is some indication that, consciously or
unconsciously, the respondents them-
selves effected limits. One evidence of
this effect observed in the pretest was
an implausibly low number of cases re-
porting multiple incidents of victimiza-
tion, that is, a high proportion of all
respondents had no victimization at all
to mention, or else reported just a single
incident. These concentrations were re-
garded as implausible by considering
hypothetical probability distributions of
victimization. One such model assumes
a constant and equal probability of
victimization for all respondents, which
would be true were people completely
passive agents and if criminals selected
victims randomly. If the more plausible
assumption is made that some people
are more victimization-prone than oth-
ers, a yet greater proportion of cases of
multiple victimization can be expected.
(Operating in the opposite direction
would be &dquo;once bitten, twice shy&dquo; ten-
dencies, however, which would cluster
cases around one incident.)
Successive revisions of the interview-
ing approach in pretests, the pilot study,
and the supplemental study produced
greater proportions of respondents re-
porting multiple victimization. Judging
from the impressions of interviewers,
however, even the final instrument,
which yielded data consistent with a
probability model assuming differential
proneness to victimization among the
population, still suffered from some out-
put restriction. Interpretations of ex-
perience in the interview situation sug-
gested that a certain point is reached
when a respondent no longer feels he
is being unco-operative if he chooses
not to rack his brains further and
says: &dquo;No, there was nothing else that
happened.&dquo;
INCIDENCE OF VICTIMIZATION
The interviews with household
&dquo;screener&dquo; respondents by NORC pro-
duced about 4,000 reports of victimiza-
tion among the 33,000 persons covered
by the household sample. One-fifth
of these incidents were not followed up
successfully with an interview of a vic-
tim (or an adult informant, in the case
of a juvenile victim) to produce the
data required to evaluate and analyze
the incident. These evaluations, in turn,
resulted in rejecting about 1,000 more
of the incidents as not meeting one or
another criterion for judging whether a
crime had indeed occurred during the
appropriate one-year period against the
person or personal property of a mem-
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ber of the household. The incidence
estimations, thus, rested on just some-
what over half of the originally men-
tioned victimizations.
For each of the person offenses, the
numbers are so small as to afford little
confidence that successive samplings
would not yield estimates very much
higher or lower than those reported.
Among the Index offenses, only bur-
glary and larceny are numerous enough
to permit reliable cross-tabulations going
much beyond dichotomies. The NORC
sample yielded twice as many incidents
of victimization that were not in the
Index classes, however. The over 2,000
incidents of victimization of all types
which were available afford many pos-
sibilities for grouping for analytic pur-
poses (see Table 4).
The precinct studies had even more
severe limitations because of small
numbers.
Including all types of offenses, there
were about 6.3 incidents of crime
counted for every 100 persons in the
national sample during the twelve
months, July 1965 through June 1966.
Only 691 of the incidents used in the
analysis were Index offenses, so that the
incidence rate for these crimes was only
.02. The bulk of these Index incidents
involved burglary and larceny-there
were but 117 Index offenses involving
force, violence, or threats thereof-or
an incidence rate for such offenses of
under .004.
The methodology used in the precinct
studies, and in all probability the higher
crime incidence of the areas studied, re-
sulted in their yielding much higher
rates.
For each respondent in the BSSR
and Michigan studies, there were almost
ten times as many incidents of victimi-
zation reported and accepted as valid
as in the national study. Including all
types of crime, the range among the
precincts in the Michigan survey was
from .73 victimizations per respondent
per year in a Boston district to a low of
.43 in Chicago. The BSSR pilot survey
had comparable rates-the range was
from .35 to .41 in three Washington
precincts, and the supplemental BSSR
study in a fourth Washington precinct
had a victimization rate of .75. About
45 per cent of the incidents in the
precinct studies were Index crimes.
But this does not mean that victimi-
zation was ten times as frequent among
the residents of the three cities as in
the national survey. First of all, the
precinct-study estimations deal exclu-
sively with persons over seventeen years
of age. Few of the offenses against
individuals in the NORC study oc-
curred to the one-third of the sample
that is under this age.
Even more important is the fact that
precinct studies involve a sample of only
one person in each household. For
household offenses, there are as many
putative victims as there are household
members. Thus, for these offenses,
the victimization rate is, very roughly,
3.3 times as great as an incidence rate
based on all members of the sample and
about twice as great if just the adult
population rate is desired. Since the
large majority of the Index offenses
are of this kind, the national survey
victimization rate19 for Index crimes is
in excess of .05 as contrasted with the
per capita offense rate of .02.
An additional understatement of the
national rate by about 12 per cent may
be inferred from descriptions of the
procedure. This resulted from members
of the sampled households who could
not be reached for victimization inter-
19 See discussion of &dquo;victim risk rates&dquo; in
Biderman and Reiss, op. cit.
18 This differs slightly from an offense rate
to the extent that persons not members of
the sampled household may have been among
the multiple victims of robberies and certain
Part II incidents.
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views being retained in the base on
which rates were calculated, as well as
from arbitrarily limiting interviews to
two incidents for any person. 20
COMPARISON WITH POLICE STATISTICS
Despite the presumed tendency to-
ward underestimation, the survey con-
sistently found victimization more fre-
quent than police statistics led one to
suspect. It was no simple matter, how-
ever, to provide a quantitative expres-
sion of just how much greater the sur-
vey incidence was. This was true de-
spite the fact that in design and analysis
the surveys had been adapted to the
problem of providing the readiest com-
parison with police data-these adapta-
tions often entailing departures from the
most logical or efficient survey pro-
cedures.21 Most of the difficulties of
comparison derive from the fact that
the basic unit of police statistics is the
offense; that of the survey is the vic-
timization experience of the individual
citizen. Victim risk estimates are de-
rived readily from survey data; offense
rates, only by using corrections based
on assumptions or extrinsic and often
not ideally suitable data. A second
source of difficulty in comparisons is
separating offenses against businesses
and organizations from those against
individuals in police data. The local
area surveys face the additional diffi-
culty of comparing data collected from
victims at their place of residence with
police data that are organized by the
location of the offense. While in an
astonishingly high proportion of the
cases, victimization was found by the
surveys to take place at or close to
home, only in Washington, D.C., could
any adjustment be made readily to
eliminate victimization of transients
from police data (and the data available
for this correction were far from ideal
for the purpose). In addition, victimi-
zation of persons in the sample that
occurred outside of their area of resi-
dence had to be omitted in comparisons.
The precinct studies, furthermore, had
to restrict comparisons to victimization
of adults.
Perhaps the major source of noncom-
parability stems from the necessity of
the surveys’ acceptance of victim testi-
mony at its face value while the police
function as more than passive recorders
of citizen offense reports. Several pro-
cedures were applied by the surveys to
come as close to the legal and evidenti-
ary evaluations of the respondents’ re-
ports as police might make, short of
actual investigation.
Interviewers’ subjective impressions
regarding the respondent’s veracity and
his demeanor in relating details of a
particular incident were used. Inter-
view records were examined for incon-
sistencies and implausibilities. In addi-
tion to these tests being extremely un-
reliable, neither cast doubt on substan-
tial numbers of the claimed victimiza-
tions-in the NORC survey, only 0.4
per cent were &dquo;unfounded&dquo; on these
grounds. Many more alleged incidents
were rejected for tabulation because the
respondent’s description did not assert
sufficient evidence that a crime had
occurred, for example, that the wallet
had not been lost negligently, that the
incident was not more appropriately
classifiable as a fight than as an assault.
Expert judgments were also applied for
evaluating incident descriptions on evi-
dentiary and legal criteria-policemen
(NORC) and lawyers (NORC and
Michigan) were used.
The foregoing recital does not ex-
haust the definitional and operational
complexities that should caution com-
20 A very slight underestimation of rates
derives from only one victim being counted
by NORC in the occasional incident wherein
more than one member of the household is
victimized by a crime against the person.
21 Biderman and Reiss, op. cit.
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parisons between crime as measured by
the surveys and as measured by the
police. Comparisons, it should be
stressed, become possible only by what
amounts to some coercion of either or
both sets of data from their most
natural form and fullest scope.
COMPARISONS OF OFFENSE RATES
As was shown in Table 1, the total
rate for offenses against individuals and
residences estimated from the survey
is more than twice that of the UCR.
This indication of the great volume of
unrecorded Index crime is particularly
striking, in that almost all procedural
failings of the survey method which
have been identified in the preceding
discussion tend to lower the survey rate
from a &dquo;true value.&dquo; (&dquo;Time telescop-
ing&dquo; in the national survey and use of
victim rather than offense rates for
robberies are the major exceptions.)
As compared with the national esti-
mates, the precinct studies, except for
the one precinct in which the study was
hampered by a riot, uniformly produced
offense-rate estimates that had even
greater divergence from those reported
by the police departments for the same
precincts. This was true even when
survey-derived figures, which included
only offenses against respondents that
occurred in the precinct of residence,
were compared with police rates that
included nonresident victims. For all the
precincts combined, the survey-derived
estimates for Index offenses were about
four times that of rates of offenses
known to the police. Stated in forms
of rates per 100,000 population, the city
area estimates ranged from 10,000 to
24,000-an altogether different order of
magnitude from that of either city
police data or national survey estimates.
EFFECTS OF NONREPORTING TO POLICE
The &dquo;dark figure&dquo; of crime usually
is attributed primarily to the failure of
citizens to report victimization to the
police. In 38 per cent of the Index
incidents tabulated in the national sur-
vey, the victims stated that the offense,
to their knowledge, indeed did not be-
come known to the police (see Table 5).
But the national survey rate, estimated
on the basis exclusively of incidents said
to have been reported, was still 35 per
cent greater than that of the UCR.
The excess was greatest for burglaries
( 83 per cent ) . Auto thefts were the one
exception. The survey-derived rate was
22 per cent lower than that of the UCR.
This is to be expected, considering un-
derenumeration by the survey and that
auto thefts are, presumably, seldom left
unreported to the police.
The possible interpretations of the
discrepancy between survey and UCR
estimates are, on the one hand, that the
survey errs either ( 1 ) by overestimating
crime, (2) by overestimating the re-
porting of crime to the police, or (3)
by overclassifying crime; or, on the
other hand, that UCR ( 1 ) fails to
reflect all crimes reported to the police
TABLE 5-ESTIMATED RATES OF INDEX
OFFENSES REPORTED TO THE POLICE
(NORC SURVEY)
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or (2) is affected by &dquo;down-classifying&dquo;
of crimes.
Some of these possibilities were ex-
plored intensively in the BSSR study.
For Part I offenses, the initial BSSR
estimate of the number of offenses
against adults occurring in their home
precinct and reported to the police was
approximately four times the number
of Actual Offenses Known as reported
by the police. A downward adjust-
ment of the survey estimate equivalent
to the over-all police &dquo;unfounding rate&dquo;
was first applied, but this produces a
reduction of only 4.4 per cent. Next,
to allow for any possible errors in ad-
justments of police data to take into
account offenses against organizations,
minors, and nonresidents, survey esti-
mates were compared with unadjusted
police totals. The survey estimates
were still more than twice the police
total. Finally, to correct for possible
differences in the way in which reports
are classified by the police and by the
survey, an estimate based on all survey
incidents was compared with all classes
of offenses in police statistics in which
victimization could have been involved,
plus all disorderly conduct charges, as
well as all &dquo;Miscellaneous Incident
(Non-Offense) Investigated&dquo; report cate-
gories which may have involved a
victim complaint. The survey estimate
for reported victimization of residents
of the precinct was still more than a
third again as large as the resulting total
of police report entries.
For these areas of Washington, D.C.,
this first attempt at use of the survey
method suggests that police statistics
grossly underenumerate actual inci-
dence. If respondent testimony may be
accepted, the &dquo;dark figure&dquo; presumably
involves the police not reporting as
offenses those incidents that citizens
report to them as such to a far greater
extent than the failure of citizens to
report victimization to the police.
A possible implication is that, at a
minimum, full police reporting of citizen
complaints would reveal half of the
&dquo;dark figure&dquo; accessible to survey me-
thods such as were employed in these
studies.
It is possible that victims exaggerate
the frequency of reporting to the police,
in that it is &dquo;the right thing to do.&dquo;
Validation efforts would depend on the
costly, as well as inconclusive, step of
checking survey reports against police
records. Considerable unreliability of
testimony was indicated by a check in
the opposite direction which was per-
formed.
The Michigan study took advantage
of a separate investigation it was con-
ducting in which observers employed
by the study accompanied police offi-
cers. They recorded transactions be-
tween the police and citizens. A sample
of persons who had been observed to
have reported on a victim experience
to the police were interviewed several
months after the event. The same
interview schedule was used as that in
the cross-sectional survey. In the fol-
low-up interviews, over 20 per cent of
these citizens failed to relate the inci-
dent which they had been observed re-
porting to the police. Should similar
checks with more substantial samples
confirm a rate of underreporting even
close to this magnitude for crimes
known to the police, even when followed
up fairly soon after the event, the
survey method would have to be re-
garded as dipping only shallowly and
perhaps inaccurately into &dquo;dark figure&dquo;
crimes.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Respondents in a national survey re-
port being victimized by crime more
than twice as frequently as would be
expected on the basis of the UCR
&dquo;Crime Index.&dquo; Surveys of residents of
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selected areas in three cities showed
even sharper positive divergences in
incidence from estimates based on police
statistics.
Nonetheless, there are many indica-
tions that the survey interviews failed
to measure exhaustively the victimiza-
tion experienced by citizens. Many of
these difficulties stem from the fact that
most incidents of victimization, even
many that are &dquo;serious&dquo; legally, are not
highly salient experiences in a person’s
life and hence are not readily recalled
in an interview. Often, respondents
are also poor informants regarding of-
fenses committed against others who
live with them. Various steps in proc-
essing data to gain comparability with
police statistics also reduce incidence
estimates made by the surveys. Im-
proved procedures in future applications
of the survey method would yield higher
incidence rates than in these first trials
of the method.
Selectivity in the underenumeration
makes the data unsuitable for compara-
tive analysis of the objective victimiza-
tion among various components of the
population.
Victimization rates (victim-risk meas-
ures) are directly derivable from survey
data. These rates are higher than
offense rates, in that more than one
person is affected by the majority of
offenses. Offense statistics do not dis-
close the number of victims in crimes
against property and, in the case of both
property and person offenses, do not
afford a ratio of victims to a pertinent
population at risk.
Respondents claim that a high pro-
portion of Index offenses became known
to the police. If the respondents’ re-
ports are creditable, the &dquo;dark figure,&dquo;
at least in one city, is due in greater
measure to police statistics not reflecting
citizens’ reports to the police than to
nonreporting of crimes by citizens.
